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Tunisia’s Security Concerns
BESENYŐ János,1 PRANTNER Zoltán2
Ansar al-Sharia, established in April 2011, is the most prominent Salafist jihadist 
organization in Tunisia. At the beginning the movement, which sympathizes with 
the ideology of al-Qaeda, focused its attention on humanitarian and missionary 
works. Later it did not balk at using violence to enforce religious norms. The con-
flict between the Ennahda Government and the organization culminated between 
May and July, 2013. At the end of August the Government finally designated An-
sar al-Sharia a terrorist-organization. According official reports, the organization 
is responsible for planning several unsuccessful attacks during the intervening 
months. Additionally, Okba bin Nafaa, the military wing of Ansar al-Sharia, has 
been fighting an open war with the Tunisian Army in the Algerian border region 
since December 2012.
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Introduction
The Salafist jihadist movements have been strengthened significantly in Tunisia after the 
2011 Arab Spring. The Ansar al-Sharia (AST), the most prominent local organization, came 
into existence after three months of the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime. The movement, which 
has unreservedly sympathized with the ideology of the international al-Qaeda terror-orga-
nization, emphasized works of mercy and dawa (missionary activity) since the beginning. 
It has taken full advantage of the critical economic conditions of the country and the social 
tensions that originated from the previous situation. It has not flinched away from using the 
hisba, the enforcement of Islamic doctrines with violence, to achieve its purpose. The con-
flict between the Ennahda majority government and the organization culminated in the May 
through July, 2013 period. Finally, at the end of August that year the cabinet declared the 
Ansar as-Sharia a terrorist organization. According to government sources, the organization 
has attempted a number of attacks since then. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, the military wing 
of the organization, has waged open war on the Tunisian Army in the Algerian border region.
The Establishment of Ansar Al-Sharia
The Salafist Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) was set up in late April, 2011 by Abu 
Iyad al-Tunisi (also known as Seifallah Ben Hassine) in Soukra, one of the suburbs of Tunis. 
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Previously, the founder was one of the Tunisian activists of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. He was 
released in an amnesty, like his other Islamist companions.3 
From the beginning its openly declared aim was to provide those services, that according 
to its point of view, the government was incapable of providing. The exact structure of the 
organization was unknown until now. We only know that it is a hybrid organization, consist-
ing of a network of small, local groups in an overall pyramidal structure. According to the 
available information, the groups average 20 members and enjoy considerable autonomy. It 
is also common knowledge that the organization has divided the country into three districts 
(northern, central and southern) in the interests of effective district direction. [1] Only a 
smaller group of the core leaders has been named publicly beside Abu Iyad (eg. Hassan Ben 
Brik, the leader of the Dawa Committee, Ahmed al-Akrami, the coordinator of the medical 
and humanitarian activities of the organization or Sayf al-Din Ben Rayes, who produced the 
statements and sermons of the group). Supposedly, they are assisted by several individuals in 
the background. These individuals, who had military experience (eg. Tarek Maaroufi, Sami 
bin Khamis Essid or Mehdi Kammoun) were subsequently linked to Ansar al-Sharia’s violent 
activities. [2: 10]
There has been no reliable information about the exact size of the organization, because 
membership figures were regularly underestimated by the governmental authorities and over-
estimated by its supporters.4 The first adherents came mainly from the working-class in Bab 
al-Khadra as well as al-Kambes and Malik bin Anas Mosques. The popularity of the AST 
grew dynamically, due to its intensive campaign and religious activities in the local mosques. 
In a short while, mainly desperate youths who were disappointed in the revolution and the re-
gime became the base of the AST (this was contrary to the other Salafist political movements, 
the Jabhat al-Islah, whose supporters came primarily from a more mature age-group). [4] 
From the beginning the organization emphasized the importance of propaganda to pass its 
message to a wide audience. It established the al-Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF) on 
April 27, 2011 to popularize its ideology and activities. It ran its own blog and created Face-
book pages, and it regularly published in various press forums. The propaganda activity of 
the AST increased the number of its adherents in Tunisia, and it has attracted the attention of 
Arab readers of the two most popular online jihadist forums, the Ansar al-Mujahidin and the 
al-Jahad al-Alami. 
Officially it covered its expenses from donations that mainly Tunisian locals offered in 
the mosques during the Friday sermons. However, it was clear that the funds thus collected 
were not enough to defray the costs of the organization’s various humanitarian activities. 
Therefore there could be no doubt that its works of mercy were also sponsored by prominent 
foreign – mainly Saudi and Kuwaiti – foundations. Beside the activity on behalf of the com-
munity, it made an intensive campaign to demand the release of such Islamist prisoners as the 
blind Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the religious leader of the Egyptian al-Gamaa al-Islami-
3 The Tunisian Combat Group was co-founded by Abu Iyad and Tarek Maaroufi in June, 2000. The organization 
trained volunteers in Afghanistan, forged documents and passed activists from Europe to Afghanistan. Later 
it was linked to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghan Northern Alliance, on 
September 9, 2011. The United States designated the group a foreign terrorist organization on December 20, 
2004. Abu Iyad was imprisoned by the Tunisian authorities in 2003 and he was released after the Jasmine 
Revolution.
4 One of the AST’s activists estimated the number of members between 90 and 100 individuals in March 2013, 
which we can accept only with considerable skepticism. [3]
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yah or Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda in Europe. In addition, it held 
peaceful sit-ins on several occasions outside the Iraqi embassy in Tunis on behalf of Tunisian 
activist of al-Qaeda, who were imprisoned in Iraq during 2005–2007. It also demonstrated 
in front of the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it demanded that the government 
intervene in their case. [4] The name of the organization itself shows that the main objective 
of the Ansar al-Sharia is to strongly promote the application of the sharia in everyday life. 
The ideas of AST about the new Tunisia were clearly manifested during the nationwide con-
ference in Kairouan on May 20, 2012. On this occasion Abu Iyad urged the reform of the 
media, tourism and commercial sectors in accordance with Islamic principles. He also felt it 
necessary to create an Islamic trade union to counteract the powerful and secularist Tunisian 
General Labour Union. [6]
The Ideology of Ansar Al-Sharia
There is no doubt that Ansar al-Sharia was strongly influenced by the world-view of al-Qaeda. 
It supported unreservedly the global jihad ideology of the international terrorist organization. 
It also posted on its forums the views of Ayman al-Zawahiri and his prominent adherents on 
several occasions.5 Despite this ideological affinity, in the beginning the group concentrated 
primarily on recruiting local volunteers and on its missionary activities (dawa). According to 
their opinion, Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali established and ruled a profane state that favored 
secularism and downplayed Islam. Therefore AST considered it its main duty to return to the 
right way and to enforce strongly Islamic values in everyday life. The long-term aim of the 
organization was to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. To achieve that goal, it was ready to 
cooperate with any organization that had similar ideas.
The Ansar al-Sharia emphasized several times that its aim was not to acquire state power. 
In contrast to the Egyptian Salafist parties it did not want to participate in internal politics so 
it did not set up its own legal party. It condemned the state and democracy and in the distrib-
uted pamphlets it pronounced the participation in political life a polytheist act. It encouraged 
fellow Islamists to absent themselves from elections and it warned the participants that they 
would regret their actions on the Day of Resurrection, because they infringed on God’s sov-
ereignty. In addition, AST regularly posted fatwas and videos from popular Salafi jihadist 
sheiks arguing against democracy, in order to discourage potential voters from voting.6 
Another important aspect in which it differed from the international terrorist organizations 
was that although it adhered to the radical interpretation of Islam, it rejected violent jihad in 
Tunisia. This attitude was not due to the weakness of Salafi jihadist tendencies that had not 
been able to gain strength earlier in Tunisia. The main reason was that the government had 
not encouraged the emigration of undesirable persons during the Ben Ali regime. Therefore 
5 For example, in a statement AST congratulated the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq, the Caucasus 
Emirate, the Islamic Maghreb Emirate and the Somali comrades in November 2011. In addition, the group 
asked God to give victory to the mujahedin, raise the word of Islam, bring together the Muslims and annihilate 
such enemies of Islam as the Jews, Christians, atheists and apostates.
6 For example, Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti’s proclamation, which emphasized the un-Islamic character 
of democratic elections, received great publicity. Another fatwa of the Sheikh against Ennahda also received 
prominent place on the forums of the organization. In this he characterized the program of the Islamist party 
as a violation of monotheism, described its secretary-general, Rachid Ghannouchi and his colleagues as 
heretics and declared the position of the party on jihad, dhimmis, infidels, women and music as a “pollution” 
of Islam.
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the volunteers returning from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal did not carry out such 
violent acts like their Egyptian, Algerian or Libyan fellows did during the 1990’s. [7] It must 
also be noted in connection with this statement of non-violence that Ansar al-Sharia only 
rejected an open fight with external enemies of Islam in Tunisia. This must be noted, because 
the main aims of the organization were missionary activities and the so-called hisba – the 
avoidance of forthcoming wrong; in practice this means the enforcement of religious norms 
in the Muslim community. According to Ansar al-Sharia’s interpretation this entitled them to 
attack those individuals and institutions that violated those norms.7 
Non-violent dawa at home did not keep Abu Iyad from supporting violent jihad in for-
eign countries. In an interview in March 2012 he considered legal the struggle in Iraq after 
the American withdrawal, and that struggle also should have been extended to Iran. For this 
reason he created a dual strategy in the interest of maintaining non-violence and alleviating 
tensions in Tunisia. He offered his followers an opportunity to decide whether they wanted to 
do peaceful missionary works at home, or fight abroad. Those who wanted to fight were sent 
to Syria, Libya or Mali.8 At home he consistently endeavored to promote true Islamic morals 
mainly through verbal persuasion and exemplary behavior among the people. In this regard 
he shared Sheikh Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi’s thoughts. According to the Palestinian writ-
er with Jordanian citizenship, jihad meant a non-violent aspiration to realize a life style in 
accorded with Islam. He did not want to persuade the community through the destruction of 
enemies, but rather through education and missionary works. Other influential theorists of 
the movement are Sheikh al-Khatib al-Idrisi, who is one of the most prominent Salafi cler-
ics in Tunisia, the imprisoned Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the Syrian Abu Basir Tartusi, Anwar 
al-Awlaki, who was killed in the end of September, 2011, or Hani Sabahi. [1] The group also 
reveres Yosri bin Fakher Trigui (also known as Abu Qudama al-Tunisi), who was arrested 
in Iraq in 2006 and executed in November 2011 for his participation in the bombing of the 
Shiite tombs at Marqad al-Imamayn Houssin and Hadi al-Askari. AST considered Trigui 
an illustrious martyr of the movement the equivalent of Osama bin Laden or Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi. More than a thousand members of the Ansar al-Sharia carried banners and plac-
ards with Islamic slogans at his funeral. [11]
In practice the organization’s goal was to offer concrete choices in accordance with Islam 
for everyday challenges and tribulations. For example AST often organized presentations 
for winning hearts and minds. During these events notable Tunisian scholars popularized 
the idea of returning to Islamic values. In addition, during the weekly market it regularly 
distributed among the people the works of Salafist literature; the activists cleaned the streets 
as a service to the public; they nursed elder locals in their home, and performed humanitarian 
work in the refugee camps as well as in the region afflicted by natural disasters. The organiza-
tion helped those in need with donations of food, medicine and clothes in the backward rural 
7 The first targets of hisba were women. Shortly after the revolution, the enraged mobs set brothels on fire 
in Kairouan, Médenine, Sfax and Sousse. During these attacks the prostitutes were seriously beaten. Later 
there were frequent cases of women walking in public being attacked, because their clothes were found 
objectionable according activists’ judgment. [8: 4] [9]
8 In the interview with al-Sabah Abu Iyad claimed that there was a sizeable group of young men beside him who 
wanted to travel to Syria to fight in the jihad. According to Aaron Zelin’s research, one year later the number 
of the Tunisian volunteers was between 150 and 300. In February 2013 alone 26 of them lost their lives. Two 
months later Tunisian Foreign Minister Othmane Jarandi stated that the Tunisian volunteers who were fighting 
in Islamist rebel ranks in Syria numbered some 800. Also a local radio station announced that 132 Tunisian 
fighters were killed during the fighting in and around the city of Aleppo in February alone. [10] [7] [3]
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areas that had previously been neglected by the government. AST took maximum advantage 
of the opportunities of the modern age to form a wide support base. This is why AST con-
tinuously reported its activities on the internet and illustrated them with photos. At the same 
time it also reviewed the events and new issues about various jihadists, supplementing their 
Facebook pages. [3]
Warning Signs
There were many warning signs from 2011 that the Salafists were prepared to enforce their 
Islamist mindset and rebuild the state according to their own design as soon as possible, 
despite their professions of non-violence on several occasions. The first serious conflict be-
tween the government and Ansar al-Sharia occurred on June 26, 2011, when the Tunisian 
film “No God, No Master” was presented. Like other Islamist organizations, Ansar al-Sharia 
declared the film apostate. Several dozen activists demonstrated on Habib Bourghiba Avenue 
against the work that outspokenly criticized political Islam. The demonstrators trooped to the 
Afric’Art Theater, where the film was being screened. They broke into the building, assaulted 
the manager of the establishment and destroyed the projection equipment. The police arrested 
seven individuals after they arrived at the scene. Two days later about 100 Salafist demanded 
the release of the detainees in front of the Justice Ministry. There was a verbal exchange 
between the protesters and five lawyers and the latter ones were attacked. One lawyer was so 
severely beaten that he had to be hospitalized. After the incident the interim government de-
termined to crack down on Islamists and arrested 26 persons, among them several members 
of Ansar al-Sharia. [12] [13]
Some three months later, as the date of the National Assembly elections was approaching, 
tempers flared up again due to another film. This time the cause was the Oscar-nominated 
film Persepolis. As a matter of fact, the animated work showed the Iranian revolution through 
the eyes of a young girl. Abu Iyad especially disapproved of that scene, when God appeared 
in human form to teach the hero about forgiveness. He incited his fellows against the Nessma 
private television channel after it had broadcast the film on October 7, 2011. The next day 
the Islamists tried to set fire to the TV station and the channel owner’s home was raided. [14]
By this time the demonstrations in the capital were usually organized on behalf of wom-
en wearing niqabs (which covers the whole body) on university campuses. The protesters 
attacked with sticks, stones and knives, the riot police tried to disperse them with tear-gas. 
The street disturbances soon reached the universities as well. The Salafist activists attacked 
secular minded students and a little group of undergraduates lead by Mohamed Bakti practi-
cally kept Habib Kazdaghli, the dean of Manouba University as hostage in his own office for 
weeks, in order to force him to give permission to wear the niqab in classrooms and during 
examinations. [15] [16] The influence of religious extremism was clearly and alarmingly 
manifested on March 16, 2012. Thousands of Islamist protesters under al-Qaeda’s signature 
black banner demonstrated in front of the Constituent National Assembly building in Tunis, 
demanding the acknowledgement of sharia as the fundamental source of law in the future 
constitution. [17] The flag appeared again nine days later in downtown Tunis during the 
demonstration organized by Ansar al-Sharia to glorify the Koran. The demonstrators flew one 
from the clock tower near one of the busiest crossroad of the capital and demanded the estab-
lishment of a new caliphate. The demonstration started peacefully, but violence occurred on 
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this occasion, too. This time the participants interrupted a performance in front of a theater, 
and attacked and maltreated the members of the company. [18] 
In La Marsa, one of Tunis’s suburbs, other disturbances broke out on account of an art 
exhibition on June 12, 2012. This time Ansar al-Sharia and Salafists were angered mainly by 
three pictures: one caricatured Mecca, the other portrayed a nude woman and on the third one 
the artist had spelled out the word “Allah” with strings of ants. Tempers got out of control 
after the assault on the gallery. Thousands of protesters set alight the offices of the country’s 
main labour union in Jendouba, torched a local court in west Tunis and threw rocks and Mo-
lotov cocktails at several police stations. The police again tried to disperse the crowd using 
tear-gas. By the end of the riots 65 members of the security forces were wounded and 162 
people had been detained. [19] [20]
The turning-point with long-term consequences occurred on September 14. The demon-
strations begun after Friday prayers on account of a film which portrayed the Prophet Moham-
mad engaged in vulgar and offensive behavior. The disturbances quickly spread throughout 
the capital when Ansar al-Sharia endorsed the rallying call on Facebook by Islamist activists. 
The protesters marched to the U.S. embassy in Tunis with sticks, stones and petrol bombs 
where they forced their way into the building and started systematically plundering it. Some 
individuals pulled down the U.S. flag flying over the embassy, burned it, and replaced it with 
the black flag of Islam, while others carried off the valuables. Luckily no one from the embas-
sy staff was hurt, due to the quick arrival of riot police, although at first the attackers resolutely 
stood on the defensive. Their resistance ended when the police started using live ammunition. 
The protesters tried to leave the place quickly after they smashed windows and attempted to 
set fire to several rooms. During this time, others broke into the nearby American School. 
They set fire to that building as well, after they took away some laptops and computers. On 
this occasion the clashes resulted in fatalities, and at least 29 people were injured and two lost 
their lives. The Libyan authorities subsequently linked the events with the attack against a U.S. 
embassy facility that occurred three days earlier in Benghazi. According to their suspicions, 
the Libyan branch of Ansar al-Sharia was the mastermind behind the disturbances that resulted 
in the death of ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other American citizens. [21]
The assassination of the well-known leftist-secular Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013 
was another example of declining public security throughout the country. The opposition 
leader’s death caused disturbances, which were used by some as a cover for looting. Al-
though the police arrested the majority of these individuals in short time, Ansar al-Sharia 
considered this the opportune moment to mobilize its private army, the so-called Neighbor-
hood Committees.9 At AST’s call to action, its adherents appeared within a few hours both in 
big cities and in smaller villages, which clearly illustrated the effectiveness of the organiza-
tion. The activists patrolled on streets in 10–50 member groups waving al-Qaeda’s black flag, 
and administered summary justice arbitrarily against anyone whose behavior they regarded 
substandard. Although the crisis passed with a few scuffles and the arrest of a thief, the pa-
trols’ presence made a big impression on locals who were disappointed with the cabinet’s 
9 The Neighborhood Committees were set up on October 06, 2012 in order to fill the security vacuum 
and protect inhabitants in case public security was to decline within the country. Originally this private 
organization, which could be considered a de facto non-state controlled martial law force, was to be 
activated on the first anniversary of October 23 2011 Constituent Assembly Election. Public security was not 
compromised when the date came, so the committees were not called out.
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policy. This, together with social activity for the public welfare showed explicitly that AST 
would soon form a separate state within the Tunisian state. Ennahda had to do something, 
because co-operation was growing stronger between the party’s hard-line elements and AST, 
due to the concessions to the secularists in the writing of the constitution. [22] 
The Proscription of the Movement
In the beginning the moderate Islamist Ennahda adopted an extremely tolerant policy to-
wards Ansar al-Sharia after winning the National Assembly elections on October 23, 2011. 
The party made no secret of its hope that co-operation could emerge between them. It took 
the initiative and suggested a national dialogue with the salafist’s. With this step it expected 
to prevent the radicalization of fundamentalists who posed a dangerous threat with their ille-
gality and commitment to terrorist acts in the long run. However, the positive proposal had 
little effect on the Jihadist movement, because several members have viewed Ennahda with 
considerable skepticism from the beginning. Against these positive efforts the first conflict 
occurred in 2011, when Ennahda formed a coalition with such non-Islamist parties as Con-
gress for the Republic and Ettakol. The situation became more and more critical in 2012. The 
number of Salafist demonstrations increased on the street where the marchers protested with 
violent acts against government policy. The tension culminated in December when Salafists 
attacked alcohol vendors and mobbed a hotel where they caused serious damage to the fur-
niture. At the end of the month the cabinet responded by inviting those Salafist groups that 
rejected violence to a new dialogue. It emphasized the importance of the gesture, and at the 
same time it stressed that it was not going to enter into discussions with those who disturb 
public order and promised serious sanctions against them. [23]
The relation between Ennahda and Ansar al-Sharia worsened, because the movement’s 
ideological affinity to al-Qaeda, as well as its missionary activities soon became suspect. In 
government circles AST’s ability to recruit adherents in such respectable numbers during a 
short period caused growing anxiety.10 The program called Abna’kum fi Khidmatikum (Your 
Sons Are at Your Service) impressed particularly deeply those who were disillusioned by the 
government’s policies. These people, who had been disappointed by the revolution, observed 
the work of the organization with growing interest. They more and more saw the care in AST 
that they had previously expected from the government.
As the charity works of the organization became known throughout the country, the 
government first targeted its propaganda. Its Facebook-profile was banned on 12 occasions 
between September 2012 and March 2013, with no effect. The movement emerged again 
and again to inform its adherents continuously. [3] After the attack on the U.S embassy the 
cabinet was forced to accept the demand of the political opposition, and numerous Jihadists 
– among them several Ansar al-Sharia members – were detained to restrain extremists. How-
ever, it was soon obvious that the show of force did not have the expected results. Instead of 
deterring the extremists, it only encouraged them. Many imprisoned Salafists began a hun-
ger-strike as a protest against what they considered an injustice. Two of them died in prison 
in November, so instead of crushing the Islamists, the cabinet unwittingly gave martyrs to 
their movement. [25] 
10 It was a clear indication of the organization’s fast growing popularity that only a few hundred persons 
attended the 2011 conference, whereas one year later the participants’ number reached 10 000 people. [24]
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Despite the growing danger, the government was still wary of open confrontation with 
Ansar al-Sharia. Whereas several members of the organization participated regularly in 
demonstrations against blasphemous issues and acts, according to the authorities’ suspicions 
others did more than this and were linked to violent incidents and weapon smuggling in 
March 2013. However, they could not prove the charges for a long time, and the organization 
kept up its activities. Then, without any warning, on 10–11 May the security forces cracked 
down on members of the organization, who were distributing their books and pamphlets on 
the streets. In his response Abu Iyad obliquely threatened the government that he would give 
up his peaceful stand and initiate open violent jihad against it. [25] In its reaction the cabinet 
banned Ansar al-Sharia’s imminent annual congress. Tunis justified the ban by the need to 
prevent incitement for violent attacks against state institutions. The membership of the or-
ganization was highly indignant both at the decision and at the explanation. The disaffected 
AST members clashed openly with security forces in Tunis and Kairouan on May 19. The 
protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails at the policemen, set an armored vehicle on 
fire, attacked a National Guard posts, closed roads, burned a national flag and engaged in 
looting. The government gave up its tolerant rhetoric once and for all after the clashes that 
caused at least one protester’s death and injured 15 policemen. Prime Minister Ali Larayedh 
declared Ansar al-Sharia an illegal organization and for the first time he spoke about AST’s 
alleged terrorist ties and activities when he commented on the events. [27] [28]
The opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi’s death on July 25, 2013 and the following 
mass-demonstrations were a turning-point. On 27 August Prime Minister Ali Larayedh an-
nounced at a press conference that there was proof that Ansar al-Sharia was the mastermind 
behind killing Brahmi and Chokri Belaid and held them responsible for the internal crisis.11 
He also blamed them for the October 2011 assault on the Nessma TV station, the action 
against the contemporary art exhibition in June 2012 as well as the attack on the U.S. embas-
sy and American school in September 2012, when the lives of more than 100 American cit-
izens’ were put in danger. Above all, he emphasized that AST had close links with al-Qaeda 
and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.12 Regarding the murder of the two politicians he added 
that the murderers were senior leaders of AST and acted with Abu Iyad’s knowledge and 
approval. To justify the terrorist designation, he stated that the organization was part of the 
international al-Qaeda network which trained its volunteers in Libya and Syria and received 
financial support from such Arabic countries as Yemen, Libya and Mali.13 He accused AST of 
supporting the armed jihadist cell which was active on the Algerian-Tunisian border region 
and was the target of the army’s month-long operation around Mount Chaambi. Next day the 
Director of Public Security announced that there was evidence that the secret military wing 
of the organization planned to assassinate 19 public figures.14 
11 According police’s sources, both assassinations were carried out with the same weapon that they seized during 
a raid. [29]
12 Prime Minister Ali Larayedh’s announcement was based on a handwritten document, an Allegiance Act, 
between Abu Iyad and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. [30]
13 Later Ansar al-Sharia was linked to the group that bombed the vehicles of the National Guard in La Goulette 
in July. The police managed to arrest two of the perpetrators in Marnaguia in September. During the raid the 
authorities seized many home-made bombs and a considerable quantity of TNT. [31]
14 Later Tunisian government sources estimated that about 16 individuals constituted the military wing of the 
organization. It included six who prepared the operations, eight people who executed them, and two others 
responsible for mobilization and for obtaining weapons.
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In its response, announced on September 3, the organization denied the charges and 
stressed its independence and innocence. It found the terrorist designation an “honor” and 
threatened the “tyrants” who ruled Tunisia that it would wage war against them. [32] [33] 
Abu Iyad, who was accused of instigating the U.S. embassy siege and a warrant was issued 
for his arrest, went underground after the attack on the embassy. Nowadays he is supposedly 
living in Libya, where he enjoys the protection of Abdelhakim Belhadj, a former Libyan Is-
lamic Fighting Group (LIFG) commander. [30] The United State also accepted the Tunisian 
cabinet’s view in relation with Ansar al-Sharia in the beginning of 2014. According to their 
judgment, the organization became the most dangerous threat against American interest in 
Tunisia. Therefore the United States government designated the group and its leader terror-
ists on January 10. [34] [35]
The End of the Policy of Non-Violence
The jihadist cell, hiding in the Mount Chaambi region (with which AST was accused of 
co-operating with) was identified by the Tunisian authorities as the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade. 
The exact structure and the size of the terror-group as well as its leadership are unknown. 
Nowadays it seems to consist of at least two serrya (company) with rather flexible structures. 
This was the reason why the group was not paralyzed despite the considerable damage it has 
sustained during the elapsed month. The injured militants were taken away immediately by 
their companions during clashes. If the latter was impossible, they decapitated the bodies 
to avoid identification. Like the Afghan Taliban, the Peruvian Shining Path or the Algerian 
Armed Islamic Group, they also hid booby-traps under the abandoned bodies to cause further 
casualties among the security forces. [36]
The cell, whose strength was estimated about 20 jihadist fighters in May 2013, was origi-
nally composed mainly of foreign volunteers from the neighboring countries – primarily Al-
gerians and Libyans. Later many Islamist veterans, fleeing the French military intervention in 
January in North-Mali, joined it.15 The situation worsened when Ennahda increasingly turned 
against Salafist groups and reached out to secular opposition parties as a counterweight to 
the extremists. In response al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb issued a statement on March 
17, 2013, calling on Tunisian volunteers in foreign countries to return home and reverse the 
unfavorable developments in the religion. Many Tunisian veterans, who had earlier fought in 
Iraq and/or Syria, returned and joined Okba Ibn Nafaa. Others set up another group, estimat-
ed 12–15 persons, in the area of el-Kef, 160 kilometers to the north. [38]
There are indicators that the group has been closely linked to the terror-organization 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb from the beginning. According to Interior Minister Ali 
Larayedh’s announcement in December 2012, the cell came under the leadership of three 
Algerians, who were closely linked to Abdelmalek Droukdel, leader of al-Qaeda’s North-Af-
rican wing. He said that their main goal was to set up camps in the Kasserine region, where 
recruits could get initial training before sending them to one of al-Qaeda’s bases in Algeria 
15 Interior Minister Ali Larayedh announced at a press conference on December 21, 2012 that the authorities had 
arrested 16 individuals after multiple incidents against Tunisian security services. The detained individuals, 
including three Algerians and a Libyan, were allegedly linked to the al-Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb and Okba 
Ibn Nafaa Brigade terrorist-groups. [37]
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or Libya.16 His statement was subsequently confirmed by terrorists equipped with Kalash-
nikovs, heavy weapons and sniper rifles. They used – and still use – the same tactics in their 
raids around Mount Chaambi as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb had practiced in the Kaby-
lie Mountains against the Algerian army: surprise raids against mountainous military posts, 
then mutilating the bodies of dead soldiers and looting their weapons and uniforms. [39]
The terrorist-group (which had been named after an Umayyad general), first came to the 
attention of the authorities at the end of 2012. During a raid in Jendouba on December 8 that 
year the police arrested two individuals, who were supposed to be members of a Salafist 
group. They also seized a large quantity of explosives and weapons, so an increased alert was 
ordered along the Algerian border. Two days later the Tunisian National Guard was alerted 
about infiltration by four armed men in Kasserine Governorate, who sought temporary shel-
ter in the forest near Derneya. They were not willing to surrender when the soldiers called 
on them to do so, and opened fire when they saw the small strength of the detachment and 
killed adjutant Anis Jelassi. The Tunisian authorities began an extensive investigation after 
the death of the officer and arrested seven individuals. On the basis of their interrogation, 
Interior Minister Ali Rayadh, on December 21, identified the cell for the first time by its exact 
name and outlined its relationship to al-Qaeda as well as its smuggling and secret military 
training activity. [38] [40]
Following the incident in which a road-sided bomb injured the leg of a soldier on patrol in 
the National Park, the Tunisian Army launched a military offensive to eliminate them. There 
was practically no contact with the group in the first month of the two months-long operation. 
Before the patrols arrived the terrorists would always escape, leaving behind some boo-
by-traps. The Army’s casualties were caused solely by these primitive, home-made devices 
that had been built using ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Based on the explosives and documents 
seized in the abandoned camps it was clear that the terrorists had extensive foreign relations 
and considerable reserves for continuing the fight. The Army’s only solution was to pound 
dangerous areas with mortar fire. The Army declared the mountains cleared at the end of the 
operation, in which several hundred soldiers took part, three individuals were killed and 27 
wounded in the 10 explosions that occurred. [38] [41]
Unfortunately, the Army’s announcement was premature. They certainly caused serious 
damage to the terrorists, but they did not succeeded in eliminating them definitively. The cell 
struck again in the Mount Chaambi area in July 2013. They killed eight soldiers and cut the 
throats of five of them. The Army launched a new wide offensive against them as revenge, 
but the offenders again managed to escape. [42]
Open Jihad Against Security Forces
The Tunisian authorities started an intensive hunt for Ansar al-Sharia and Islamist militants 
after the proscription of the organization. During 2013 alone 1,347 persons were brought 
to trial in connection with terrorism-related charges, and more than 8,000 young men and 
women were prevented from going to Syria to fight. [43] During a police raid in the Raoued 
area outside Tunis, Kamel Gadhgadhi, the main suspect of Chokri Belaid’s assassination was 
16 He also alleged that the members of the group consisted of inhabitants of Kasserine region and Ansar al-
Sharia volunteers. His statement amounted to an open accusation against a legally functioning organization, 
without any proof. For this reason many people questioned the validity and accuracy of the statement.
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killed along with six other terrorists. The clash, in which one member of the National Guard 
was also killed, gave a lot of useful experience to the security forces. When the suspects 
were surrounded they not only rejected the offer of surrender, but two of them tried to cause 
casualties among the policemen with explosive vests on their body. The security forces also 
found a large quantity of weapons when they searched the building. This suggests that the 
terrorists probably planned to carry out an attack. [43] A further six members of the banned 
organization were detained by the antiterrorist unit in the center of Sidi Bouzid on July 10. 
Two weeks later the security forces arrested Mohamed Anis, “the Prince of Ansar al-Sha-
ria”, who had in his possession considerable funds as well as documents containing terrorist 
plans.17 According to the reports, the security forces killed several more members of the or-
ganization during October. Due to their intervention, the suicide attempt against French and 
American embassies at the end of the month also failed. Abdelmalek Droukdel had ordered 
sleeping cells of Ansar al-Sharia to carry out the attack as revenge for French military action 
in Mali and the liquidation of al-Qaeda leaders. The security forces also managed to disarm a 
suicide bomber who wanted to blow up the mausoleum of Habib Bourghiba in Monastir with 
a considerable quantity explosives in his rucksack on October 30. Unfortunately they could 
not prevent his companion from carrying out another attack. His bomb, which was concealed 
in a suitcase, was activated by a mobile phone on the beach outside the Riad Palm Hotel in 
Sousse on the same day. [46] Luckily no one but the suicide bomber was killed. 
Soon after these events the Tunisian authorities began an extensive investigation. They 
soon arrested five individuals and confiscated a considerable quantity of explosives in Mo-
nastir. The suspects revealed during their interrogation that on Abu Iyad’s order they had 
planned to attack the center of the security services, police stations as well as four supermar-
kets where alcohol was sold. [8] The security services managed to foil another attempt when 
they arrested a terrorist cell. The six terrorists allegedly wanted to target hotels or bars during 
New Year’s Eve celebrations on Djerba Island, a favorite tourist spot. [47] 
Despite these undoubtedly significant results the struggle against terrorism proved to be 
a remarkable challenge for the Tunisian armed forces. Their limited experience and lack 
of adequate equipment were serious problems.18 Their position became even more difficult 
when they had to divide their limited strength and redeploy forces to the Libyan border re-
gion that had suddenly became a danger zone after the revolution in that country. Neither the 
air strikes, nor the July 2013 offensive could completely eliminate the al-Qaeda group in the 
Mount Chaambi area. What is more, the militants killed at last 15 soldiers and policemen by 
October 2013 and killed two policemen in Beja (about 160 km north of the Chaambi region) 
on October 15, 2013. The security forces lost their confidence in the cabinet as a result of 
 
 
17 The actual influence of the banned organization was well illustrated by the fact that the companions of the 
activists arrested in July started a spontaneous demonstration on the same day at the police headquarters and 
demanded the detainees’ release. The police used tear gas and fired warning shots to disperse the mob. Also on 
the same day, Salafist extremists clashed with policemen in El Kef. They threw stones at police vehicles and 
attacked the police station with Molotov cocktails. [44] [45]
18 Rachid Ammar, the commander in chief of the Tunisian army, voiced his concern over the situation. 
According his point of view, Tunisia, unlike other countries, lacked the economic resources to fight terrorism, 
so it could easily become a second Somalia. He resigned shortly after making this statement. The Defense 
Ministry also admitted that the army was lacking equipment with which it could safely clear the mountainous 
region of the mines placed by the jihadists. [48] 
16 AARMS (14) 1 (2015)
BESENYŐ János, PRANTNER Zoltán: Tunisia’s Security Concerns
growing casualties. Their unions have organized several demonstrations, demanding the nec-
essary resources to combat jihadist elements as well as laws to protect policemen.19
The danger of terrorism increased on January 14, 2014 when Okba Ibn Nafaa merged 
with Ansar al-Sharia, whereby it transformed itself unofficially into al-Qaeda’s Tunisian 
wing. Abdelmalek Droukdel, the Algerian chief of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, ap-
pointed another Algerian, Khaled Chaieb (aka Lokman Abou Sakhr) as the leader of a new 
organization that was soon being referred to as al-Qaeda in Tunisia in the press. The new 
emir, a former chemistry student turned explosives expert, was among those responsible for 
the July 2013 Mount Chaambi massacre according to the Tunisian Interior Ministry. In his 
new position he faced a serious challenge. First of all he had to re-organize the militants who 
suffered serious losses in the operations of the Algerian and Tunisian Armies during the pre-
vious months. In addition, he had to halt the chaos that had developed within Ansar al-Sharia 
in Abu Iyad’s absence. [39] In the last six months he seems to have managed to realize his 
goals. He recruited and trained new volunteers and managed to avoid capture at the same 
time. The militants, equipped with rocket-propelled grenades and rifles, made an assault on 
two military checkpoints near Mount Chaambi on July 17, 2014. The casualties – 15 soldiers 
lost their lives and at least 20 were wounded in the attack – were the heaviest toll registered 
by the army since independence in 1956. [49]
Following these events the government set up a crisis group and closed the unlicensed 
Al-Ensan television and Nour Radio stations, as well as certain mosques, which they claimed 
had been promoting violence and jihad. [50] Above all, the Tunisian cabinet intensified its 
cooperation with neighboring Algeria and launched a joint operation to round up Islamists. 
Despite these preventive measures another raid occurred on July 26, when some 40 Islamists 
ambushed two vehicles of the army near Djebel Urgha, in Kef Governorate. In response to 
the attack (in which two soldiers died and four were wounded), the army reacted quickly and 
arrested more than 10 perpetrators two days later. [51]
Figure 1. Battles and Riots/Protests in Tunisia by Province,  
1 January 2014 – 11 August 2014. [52]
19 The growing disaffection of policemen was openly shown on October 18, 2013, when they did not allow 
President Moncef Marzouki, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh and parliamentary speaker Mustapha Ben Jaafar to 
attend the funeral ceremony for the two comrades, who were killed three days earlier by extremists. 
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Conclusion
This study has shown how the relationship between Ansar al-Sharia and the Tunisian gov-
ernment gradually worsened. The main reasons were a series of successive incidents, as well 
as responses and reactions. We can consider Anis Jelassi’s killing in December 2012 as the 
beginning of the war against the state. The attacks on soldiers, together with the deterioration 
of public order, the murder of the politician Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013, as well as the 
killing of eight members of security forces some days later put considerable pressure on the 
cabinet. The Tunisian cabinet had no choice but to designate Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist-orga-
nization and declare an open struggle against it.
Today many factors make the fight against terrorists difficult. The jihadists are indistin-
guishable from the people in appearance and dress, and they enjoy the maximum support 
among them. They build close cooperation with local smugglers in the barely controlled 
mountainous region, so they can build up reserves without any problems. The police have 
lost their prestige after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, so now eliminating the terrorists has 
become an army task. No wonder that the simultaneous tasks of securing public institutions, 
keeping public order, controlling a border of several hundred kilometers and fighting against 
terrorists have proven to be an enormous challenge. The problem is heightened by the lack of 
such technological resources (eg. enough fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and suitable mon-
itoring devices) that could compensate for their disadvantage in their personnel strength. 
Accordingly, in the current situation the measures against the jihadists are not effective. This 
carries with it the risk that the jihadists will set up bases in the region, where they can train the 
volunteers unmolested by the security forces, and deploy them later against the institutions 
and symbols of the Tunisian state.
Graph 1. Battles and Riots/Protests in Tunisia by Number of Conflict Events  
and Reported Fatalities, 1 January 2014 – 11 August 2014. [52]
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The failed attempts in the second half of 2013 are also a cause for concern. In particular, 
the selection of targets implies that the terror-organization has adopted the tactics employed 
earlier by Jamal al-Islamiyya’s, when it wanted to force its ideas on the state by attacking 
tourism. Successful pursuit of this strategy would deprive the government of its main source 
of public revenue, which it needs in order to stabilize the troubled economy – as soon as 
possible.
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